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JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF POLITICAL PARTY
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF PARTIES
(1936-1957)
G. THEODORE MITAu*
Of all the various governmental and political institutions promi-
nently associated with democracy, political parties have perhaps
had the greatest difficulty in securing acceptance as necessary and
proper instrumentalities for responsible popular government. The
bias against political parties has run deeply. George Washington
reflected a widely held view of this' when he warned his fellow
citizens that the spirit of party "serves always to distract the public
councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the
country with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the
animosity of one part against another; foments occasionally riot
and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corrup-
tion, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through
the channels of party passion." 2
Despite the rapid and significant growth of political parties-
largely an outgrowth of the mass suffrage of the Jacksonian era-
their relationship to governmental policy-making, administrative
personnel, and accountability was assiduously ignored. This was
true in even the most learned of commentaries on the American
governmental system until Bryce published his American Common-
wealth."
In the years following the Civil War, the ever increasing power
of political parties in a climate of rapid industrialization, urbaniza-
tion and immigration demanded the attention of reformers and
Muckrakers who had declared war on party bosses, political ma-
chines and governmental corruption. The cure was to be found in
greater intra-party democracy and increased popular participation
in the nomination process. Between 1875 and 1915, state after state
sought to purify parties and elections with the aid of the direct
primary, the Australian Ballot, and anti-corrupt practices legis-
lation.4 In the name of better government and more honest politics
the one time common law autonomy of political parties as non-
*Professor of Political Science, Chairman of the Department, Macalester
College.
1. See Ranney and Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System
127 (1956).
2. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 211
(Vol. I) (Richardson ed. 1897).
3. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1888).
4. See Sait, American Parties and Elections 287-93 (2d ed. 1952).
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profit, unincorporated, voluntary associations was compromised by
interventions based on statutory authority and administrative
discretion.
That the direct primary alone must assume much responsibility
for limiting party self-government, and thus contribute to the
atrophy of party organization, is an hypothesis strongly supported
by many American political scientists. 5 These studies emphasize that
political parties, or rather responsible political parties, cannot
be expected to perform their manifold functions of educating the
voters, initiating public policy, offering competition to other parties,
attracting capable candidates and, most significantly, holding gov-
ernment accountable to the electorate, if they as party organizations
are prevented from building tickets with candidates committed to
the party's program and platform.
Central to the effective performance of these various roles at
least on the state level is, of course, the hierarchy of state com-
mittees and conventions. In this paper an effort is made to discern
the present legal status and powers of such committees, and to note
the extent of their legal atrophy or impotence as it emerges from
various judicial determinations of intra-party disputes, contests
for party nomination, and from the interpretations of party statutes.
I. Finality of Committee Actions and Financial Powers
In the highly decentralized structure of the American political
party system the locus of ultimate organizational power remains in
the state party convention. The legal status and powers of such a
political convention were in issue in a recent case decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.6 If properly called under applicable
statute, such convention was held to be (1) the exclusive judge
of the election and qualifications of its members; (2) competent to
transact floor business legally despite the fact that its quorum may
be short of a majority of those entitled to participate; and (3) to
remain unaffected by the withdrawal from the convention of either
a majority or minority of the delegates.7 This case is illustrative
of a number of recent judicial decisions8 reaffirming party autonomy,
5. See, e.g., Key, American State Politics (1956); Toward a More
Responsible Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 71. (Supp. 1950) ; National
Municipal League, A Model Direct Primary (1951).
6. Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Comm. v. Holm, 227 Minn.
52, 33 N.W.2d 831 (1948).
7. Id. at 55-56, 33 N.W.2d at 833.
8. Arkansas: Park v. Kincannon, 214 Ark. 398, 216 S.W.2d 376 (1949)(in the absence of statute, court is without jurisdiction to entertain an election
contest between rival candidates for township committeeman).
Florida: Alexander v. Booth, 56 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1952) (in the absence
[Vol. 42:245
DETERMINATION OF AUTONOMY
and particularly reaffirming the finality of party decisions in matters
of intra-party disputes.
In their determination of the legal status of party officers elected
on a direct primary ballot, the courts have continued the use of
three major approaches. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has held that a member of the State Central Committee of a political
party is not only a public officer, but also a state officer because
"he is a member of a State body whose functions and duties are of a
state-wide nature." 9 On the other hand, the Texas Supreme Court
rejects the concept of a party office being a public office, even where
such a position is provided with a specific statutory definition and
authority.10 Morris v. Peters," a recent case from the Georgia
courts, illustrates an attempt to avoid this "public" versus "private"
office controversy by holding that ". . . when the law imposes duties
[on a political party officer], it also confers a right and the law will
afford protection in the performance of such duties."' 2
of statute to the contrary, national committeemen and delegates to the na-
tional conventions are to be selected according to the customs and practices
of the party).
Kentucky: O'Neil v. O'Connell, 300 Ky. 707, 189 S.W.2d 965 (1945)(intra-party disputes are to be settled by the party governing authorities).
Minnesota: Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Comm. v. Holm,
227 Minn. 52, 33 N.W.2d 831 (1948) (the court will not assume jurisdiction
in factional controversies within a party where there is no controlling
statute).
Ohio: State ex rel. Pfeifer v. Stoneking, 80 Ohio App. 70, 74 N.E.2d
759 (1946) (in the absence of statute, a political party central committee may
authorize the complete delegation of its power to its executive committee
and make rules for its own organization and conduct of business).
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth ex rel. Koontz v. Dunkle, 355 Pa. 493, 50
A.2d 496 (1947) (rejected quo warranto as a method of determining the
legal status of a political party county chairman).
Texas: Runyon v. Kent, 239 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (courts
have no power to interfere in matters involving party government to deter-
mine disputes as to regularities of elections).
9. State ex rel. Tuttle v. Republican State Central Comm., 192 So. 740,
743 (La. App. 1939). See Doyle v. Rapides Parish Democratic Executive
Comm., 32 So.2d 494 (La. App. 1947). But see Poole v. Merritt, 19 So.2d
461 (La. App. 1944); Noonan v. Walsh, 364 Mo. 1169, 273 S.W.2d 195(1954).
10. Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7, 227 S.W.2d 795 (1950) (al-
though their positions may be covered by statute, committees of any political
party in acting for the party's interests are not acting as officers of the state).
See also Kidder v. Mayor of Cambridge, 304 Mass. 491, 24 N.E.2d 151(1939); Currie v. Wall, 211 S.W.2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), rev'd, 147
Tex. 127, 213 S.W.2d 816 (1948).
11. 203 Ga. 350, 46 S.E.2d 729 (1948).
12. Id. at 361, 46 S.E.2d at 736. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461(1953) ; Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949). See also Rice v.
Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948),
where party officials were considered by the court to be de facto officers of
the state. This, of course, constituted an important element in the attack
upon electoral discrimination against Negroes.
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Whether or not a legislature may confer upon party officers the
statutory power to make nominations and legally bind the appoint-
ing authority to accept such nominations has also been the subject
of legal controversy. In an explicit reversal of an earlier decision, 3
the Indiana Supreme Court considered such a grant of power to be a
proper exercise of the state's police power.'- Reasoning that politi-
cal parties may be considered to act as state agencies with a peculiar
interest in the honest administration of elections, the court main-
tained that the interests of a strong two party system would be
better served if the county board of election were to be composed
by the choice of the two major parties.'5
In a number of cases the finality of actions and decisions taken
in the absence of specific statutory authority by political party com-
mittees were sustained where such a committee wished to accom-
plish the following: impose some "reasonable qualifications" for its
nominees ;16 "endorse," even if it contravened its own rules ;17 settle
by itself a contest for chairman where the public election machinery
was not involved ;"' develop its own rule of geographic representa-
tion ;1-9 authorize its chairman to change the time of holding county,
district, and state conventions ;20 rescind a selection of nominees once
made pursuant to statute (but before the official ballot was made up)
for any reason that the majority of the committee so deciding may
consider to be in the best interest of the party ;21 or permit its
county executive committee on basis of custom to accept the right of
voting by proxy if there is nothing in either statute or party rules
-to prohibit it.22
13. Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942).
14. State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d
225 (1947). Accord: Mills v. Gaynor, 136 Conn. 632, 73 A.2d 823 (1950) ;
Russel v. Rhea, 269 Ky. 138, 106 S.W.2d 148 (1937) ; Driscoll v. Sakin, 121
NJ.L. 225, 1 A2d 881 (1938). But this view was rejected in State ex rel.
James v. Schorr, 45 Del. 18, 65 A.2d 810 (1948), and Preisler v. Calcaterra,
362 Mo. 662, 243 S.W.2d 62 (1951), on the grounds of violating equal protec-
tion of federal and state constitutions where the statute provided that only
the two dominant political parties could be given the "right" or "privilege"
of keeping watchers and challengers at the polls.
15. State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 20, 72 N.E.2d
225, 231 (1947).
16. Yuratich v. Plaquemines Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 32
So.2d 647 (La. App. 1947).
17. Rosenberg v. Republican Party, 270 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. App. 1954).
18. Commonwealth ex rel. Koontz v. Dunkle, 355 Pa. 493, 50 A.2d 476(1947).
19. Holland v. Taylor, 153 Tex. 433, 270 S.W.2d 219 (1954).
20. Holmes v. Holm, 217 Minn. 264, 14 N.W2d 312 (1944).
21. Long v. Martin, 194 La. 797, 194 So. 896 (1940). See also Browne
v. Martin, 19 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1944).
22. State ex rel. Bullard v. County Court, 92 S.E.2d 452 (W.Va. App.
1956). But see Hart v. Sheridan, 168 Misc. 386, 390, 5 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824
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When, however, in the absence of specific statutory authority a
committee granted to its chairman the power to submit a list of
nominees for the office of election commissioner, it was held to be
an unauthorized sub-delegation of authority.23 The appointing au-
thority was granted the power by this court to "go behind the
certificate" of nomination and see if the nominees actually reflected
the action of the committee as a body as required by statute.
24
In New York, the judiciary has extensive statutory power to
determine the legal status of committees and the validity of their
actions.2 5 On the basis of such power, the courts of that state have
questioned the finality of political committee action when the com-
mittees' proceedings were so irregular as to preclude an orderly
determination of policy, and where a chairman attempted to declare
an adjournment without the assembly's approval;26 where notices
announcing the party meeting were not sent out in proper time as
provided in the party's own rules ;27 and where a subsequently
legally convened committee wished to ratify and make valid the
invalid actions of its predecessor.2 8
A statute empowering the county committee "in every city and
county" to increase its own membership by a majority vote 2 was
(Sup. Ct. 1938) ("I think it quite well settled that there is no common law
right of voting by proxy. . ."); O'Brien v. Fuller, 93 N.H. 221, 228, 39
A.2d 220, 224 (1944) (statutory language that delftates "shall elect" was
construed as legislative intent to preclude use of proxy voting).
23. State ex" rel. Robertson v. County Court, 131 W.Va. 521, 48 S.E.2d
345 (1948).
24. Id. at 527, 48 S.E.2d at 349.
25. N.Y. Election Law § 330 (1949). Summary Jurisdictions: "The
supreme court is vested with jurisdiction to summarily determine any ques-
tion of law or fact arising as to any of the subjects set forth in this section,
which shall be construed liberally. Such proceedings may be instituted as a
matter of right and the supreme court shall make such order as justice
may require.
"(2) The nomination of any candidate, or his election to any party posi-
tion, in a proceeding instituted by any candidate aggrieved or by the chair-
man of any committee as defined.., and the court may direct a re-assembling
of any convention or the holding of a new primary election where a con-
vention or primary election has been characterized by such frauds or irregu-
larities as to render impossible a determination as to who rightfully was nomi-
nated or elected... .
26. McDonald v. Heffernan, 196 Misc. 465, 92 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1949), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1054, 92 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1949).
27. Jones v. Malone, 200 Misc. 88, 101 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
See also Bannigan v. Heffernan, 280 App. Div. 891, 115 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), aft'd, 304 N.Y. 729, 108 N.E.2d 209 (1952).
28. Connolly v. Cohen, 173 Misc. 288, 17 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
See also Broderick v. Knott, 197 Misc. 114, 94 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ;
Application of Branch, 277 App. Div. 1018, 99 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1950); Banni-
gan v. Heffernan, 115 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1952), order modified, 280
App. Div. 891, 115 N.Y.S.2d 444, aff'd, 304 N.Y. 729, 108 N.E.2d 209 (1952).
29. Cal. Elections Code § 2833 (1955).
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attacked successfully in the Supreme Court of California on the
ground that it represented "local special legislation."8 0 The court
held this to constitute "an unreasoned basis for classification in
view of the fact that there was in reality only one 'city and county,'
namely San Francisco."'31
The finality of party committee decisions were also challenged
in various jurisdictions when it was found that their actions, under
applicable statutes, were of a "judicial" rather than of a mere
"ministerial" character,32 and where it was determined that its
judgments rested on an insufficient basis of fact.3 3 Where the parties
were authorized by statute to make nominations, one court sustained
a challenge to such a nomination on the ground that the committee
so empowered had itself not been properly elected, and that higher
party committees were in such a case without power to fill a vacancy
on the ballot.3 4
The doctrine of judicial non-intervention into the affairs of
political party committees was held to be an inapplicable defense
when property rights were involved in another interesting recent
case. 35 A member of such a political committee was deemed to have
a right of perpetuating testimony in an accounting proceeding
against other members of the committee for their allegedly illegal
handling of committee funds. The court considered such moneys
to be public funds in the hands of public officers. 36
Under the provisions of the Texas code of elections, county
committees of political parties are given the power to estimate
the administrative costs of printing the official primary ballots and
to allocate on a "just and equitable" basis the expenses for districts,
county and precinct offices among the candidates seeking nomina-
tions for such positions.3 7 The Texas courts have held that these
30. Stout v. Democratic County Central Comm., 40 Cal.2d 91, 251 P.2d
321 (1953).
31. Id. at 94-96, 251 P.2d at 322-23.
32. Allen v. Republican State Central Comm., 57 So.2d 248 (La. App.
1952) ; Higgins v. Barnhill, 218 Ark. 466, 236 S.W.2d 1011 (1951) ; Carroll v.
Schneider, 211 Ark. 538, 201 S.W.2d 221 (1947) ; Irby v. Barrett, 204 Ark.
682, 163 S.W.2d 512 (1942) ; Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So.2d 507 (La. App. 1942).
33. Prather v. Ray, 258 Ala. 106, 61 So2d 46 (1952).
34. O'Brien v. Fuller, 93 N.H. 221, 39 A.2d 220 (1944). A somewhat
different conclusion was reached by a Kentucky court where the State
Central Committee "as superior governing authority of the party" was
acknowledged upon the deadlock in a district committee nomination dispute
to have the power to act in that committee's place. This power was con-
sidered to be implicit in the whole body of party law. See O'Neil v.
O'Connell, 300 Ky. 707, 189 S.W2d 965 (1945).
35. Malone v. Superior Court, 249 P.2d 324 (Cal. App. 1952), aff'd,
40 Cal.2d 546, 254 P.2d 517 (1953).
36. Malone v. Superior Court, 249 P.2d 324, 328 (Cal. App. 1952).
37. Tex. Election Code Ann. § 13.08 (Supp. 1956).
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funds represent a "trust" which is to be strictly interpreted in order
to prevent disbursements for such items as committee salaries, or
any other items not specifically stipulated by statute.33 This statute
has been construed as prohibiting county committees from amend-
ing their rules in such a manner as to enable the committee to re-
quire a twenty-five per cent contribution of all such fees to cover
administrative expenses."' Following such strict statutory construc-
tion, the Texas court in Stevenson v. Sherman,40 rejected as charge-
able to the candidates of the preceding election such items as reim-
bursements of a county chairman for certain services rendered, and
purchases of certain committee furniture, even if made in accord
with "usage and custom" and approved by the party's executive
committee. The chairman and the secretary-treasurer were to be
held personally liable for expenditures not directly attributable to
the particular primary. 41
However, in the absence of such statutes, it is a well established
principle of party law that before members of a political committee
can be personally held liable, the legal relationship of agency must be
made out explicitly; it cannot be implied from the mere fact of
association.42 Moreover, it must also be shown that the members
of a committee personally authorized or ratified 43 such transactions
before contractual liability may be imposed. Even if it were demon-
strated that the treasurer of a particular political committee had
personal knowledge of the order of certain campaign literature, it
has been held that this alone would not constitute an adequate basis
38. See, e.g., Small v. Parker, 119 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Kauffman v. Parker, 99 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Lane v. Sanders,
95 S.W.2d 1327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
39. See Kauffman v. Parker, supra note 38.
40. 231 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
41. Id. at 513.
42. E.g., Daniel v. Gregg, 97 N.H. 452, 91 A.2d 461 (1952); Veal v.
Thompson, 287 Ky. 742, 155 S.W.2d 214 (1941); Bell Telephone Co. v.
Pinchot, 44 Pa. D. & C. 119 (Dist. Ct. 1941); Kommers v. Palagi, 111
Mont. 293, 108 P.2d 208 (1940) ; In re Kearney, 136 Pa. 78, 7 A.2d 159(1939). See also Mitau, Selected Aspects of Centralized and Decentralized
Control Over Campaign Finance, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 620 (1956); Notes,
40 Minn. L. Rev. 156 (1956) ; 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1259 (1953).
43. American Art Works, Inc. v. Republican State Comm., 177 Okla.
420, 60 P.2d 786 (1936). Generally at common law an unincorporated associa-
tion, like a political party, cannot maintain an action in its own name, but
must sue in the name of all the associates as party plaintiff and all the associ-
ates must be made party defendant. See Republican Central Comm. v. Cook
County Regular Republican Organization, 348 Ill. App. 189, 108 N.E.2d 524(1952) ; Saxer v. Democratic County Comm., 161 Misc. 35, 291 N.Y.S. 18(Sup. Ct. 1936).
1957]
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to impose personal liability on him. Personal ratification and
authority must be explicitly shown."
Both state and federal courts have so interpreted the law of
agency as to erect a legal wall between the candidate and his volun-
teer campaign committee when it comes to the enforcement of cam-
paign expenditure limitations in the various state corrupt practices
statutes, however unrealistically low such limitations may be."1 This
has helped to further weaken the already impotent enforcement of
such laws. However, if candidates are to be held accountable for
fiscal campaign activities allegedly undertaken on their behalf, then
by simple reciprocity" they ought to be given some real authority to
designate and approve of those who are to collect and disburse cam-
paign funds supposedly obtained to help their cause and candidacy.
While this may help fix responsibility and assist in the policing of
fiscal campaign activities, it also raises the question of practicality
for the already heavily burdened candidate. Moreover, issues of con-
stitutionality arise in requiring a citizen to obtain prior permission
from the candidate of his choice before he may financially organize
in his support.4 7
II. Party Organizational Integrity-Legal Efforts and Status
In the realm of American political analysis the concept of party
discipline is not only vague, but it is often employed to denote two
rather different qualities. In one context, the term is used to define
the extent to which governmental policy-making personnel live up
to their parties' platform or principles. Failure of such personal
loyalty or commitment would then, at least in principle, entail cer-
tain sanctions such as a refusal of electoral assistance by the national
party leadership, exclusion from party caucus, appointment to less
desirable legislative committee assignments, or inattention to their
requests for favors on behalf of constituency or constituents.
The well known failure of the American party system to develop
such an arsenal of disciplinary sanctions or to employ its weapons
in any but the most hesitant and haphazard manner has disturbed
for years those in the American political science profession most
44. Bloom v. Vauclain, 329 Pa. 460,198 Ati. 78 (1938). See also Wortex
Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954).
45. See Mitau, Selected Aspects of Centralized and Decentralized Con-
trol Over Campaign Finance, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 620 (1956).
46. This concept was central in S. 636, a bill introduced in the Senate
on Jan. 21, 1955 by Senator Hennings on behalf of himself and Senators
Hayden, Green and Gore. See 101 Cong. Rec. 543 (1955).
47. See Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elec-
tions of Committee on Rules and Administration, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
636 at 290 (1955).
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concerned with the need for a more genuinely responsible political
party system. Many of the severest critics had looked for a long
time to the British parties as models for effective policy leadership
and instruments of loyal opposition. 48 More recently, expert dis-
sents have been registered, not only as to the likelihood of importing
such a system but, perhaps more significantly, as to its desirability
within governmental arrangements such as ours. To these experts, 49
federalism, separation of powers, sectionalism, localism, the strength
of our interest groups - all of these shaped a socio-political fabric
to which our parties adapt and within which they function as
cushions and reconcilers with not inconsiderable success.
The concept of "party discipline" has also been used to describe
the responsibility of one elected in a party primary to support the
party's platform and principles as promulgated by the state conven-
tion which, under law, represents the party's supreme spokesman.
Legislatures, mainly in the South, have granted to these political
party conventions and committees the power to administer an oath
of loyalty or support to all those who wish to participate in their
party's primaries as voters or candidates.50 For example, such a
party oath was challenged recently in a Texas Repubican primary
by a voter who considered himself qualified to participate in the
precinct convention, but who was unwilling to sign a required state-
ment declaring:
"I am a Republican, and desire to participate in the Republican
Party activities in the year 1952."'
A federal district court held that the voter was ineligible to partici-
pate in the convention on the basis of a statutory provision that del-
egates elected from precinct conventions ". . . must be elected by
the voters of the political party holding said convention.1 52 This
48. See Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government(1954); Schatteschneider, Party Government (1942) ; Committee on Political
Parties of the American Political Science Association, Towards a More Re-
sponible Two-Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (Supp. 1950).
49. Goodman, How Mitch Political Party Centralization Do We Want?,
13 J. of Pol. 536 (1951) ; Turner, Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the
Floor, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 143 (1951). See also Ranney and Kendall,
Democracy and the American Party System (1956).
50. Salt, American Parties and Elections 378 (2d ed. 1952). In addition
to the oath type of closed primaries, some states have employed such "tests"
as "past allegience" and "present affiliation." A 1950 study observed some
35 states using various types of closed primaries. See Snider, American State
and Local Government 133 (1950).
51. Dickson v. Taylor, 105 F. Supp. 251, 252 (W.D. Tex. 1952).
52. Id. at 253. In a case involving States Rights dissenters, it was held
that political parties, in order to maintain loyalty and discipline in primary
and convention, have "the right to demand that those who seek to hold offices
within the party, should make a pledge to support the party nominees." Carter
v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7, 13, 227 S.W.2d 795, 798 (1950). See also Fisher v.
Taylor, 210 Ark. 380, 196 S.W.2d 217 (1946).
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paper is concerned primarily with this second type of "party disci-
pline".
Foremost in the twenty year period here under consideration
ranks, of course, the ,legal opening of the primaries to the Negro
voters of the South. The Classic case53 had brought the primaries
under federal protection where they constituted an integral aspect
of the election machinery and where they effectively controlled the
choice of candidates for national office. But the white primaries died
hard. They provided "a mechanism ideally designed to permit the
maintenance of Southern Democratic solidarity in national politics,
with the simultaneous existence of quite warm political conflict
among Southern Democratic whites on state questions. '3 4 Three
years after the Court handed down the decision in Classic, a Negro
exclusion provision by the Texas State Democratic convention was
invalidated as constituting a state sanctioned discrimination vio-
lative of the fifteenth amendment.5 5 The so-called "Boswell" amend-
ment to the Alabama Constitution, passed in 1946, under which
only persons who can understand and explain any article of the
Federal C6nstitution to the reasonable satisfaction of one of the
various election boards could qualify as electors, was held by a
federal court to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment.56 The court pointedly considered
as relevant the role played by the State Democratic Executive Com-
mittee, an official arm of the State of Alabama, in sponsoring and
leading the fight for adoption of the amendment.57
"Apparently the white primary, the most effective means of
Negro disenfranchisement, is judicially dead", concluded Professor
Key, leading authority on the politics of the South; "No alternative
subterfuge has met the test of constitutionality... [but] poll taxes,
literacy tests, and other formal suffrage requirements remained,
and their administration became more rigorous after the white pri-
mary decisions."58
Six Southern states retain the literacy requirements as a rather
effective device for keeping the Negro from the polls.55 This is
53. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
54. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction 22 (1956).
55. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
56. Davies v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
57. Id. at 879. See also Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. La. 1952).
58. Key, Political Parties and Pressure Groups 615 (1952). See also
Key, Southern Politics (1949).
59. The following southern states presently have literacy tests: Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, Virginia, Louisiana (certain exemptions are possible),
Georgia, South Carolina (ownership of property is an alternative to passing




accomplished, or at least facilitated, by "educational tests" which
provide in addition to certain other conditions that before a citizen
may qualify as a voter he must demonstrate an ability to read, write,
and understand constitutional provisions; explain obligations and
duties of citizenship; or give a "reasonable" interpretation of state
or federal constitutional language. 0 With the administration of such
provisions left largely in the hands of local registrars and court
house politicians, the rate of Negro participation in primary and
general election has so far at best advanced slowly and quite un-
evenly. 6
The newly enacted "Civil Rights Act of 1957",62 particularly
the creation of an Executive Commission on Civil Rights 3 and the
provision for an additional Assistant Attorney General, 64 could po-
tentially have the most profound legal implications for Southern
political party organizations. Included in the major provisions of
the new federal law are (1) protections afforded voters in general
as well as primary elections for federal office, 6 (2) civil and crimi-
nal'6 actions by the Attorney General in the name of the United
60. See Ala. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 32 (Supp. 1955) ("read and write any
article of the constitution of the United States in the English language") ; La.
Rev. Stat. § 18:35 (1950) ("applicants for registration shall also be able
to read any clause in the constitution of Louisiana or of the United States
and give a reasonable interpretation thereof.") ; Miss. Const. art. 14 § 244.
("Every elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications be able to
read and write any section of the constitution of this state and give a reason-
able interpretation thereof to the county registrar. He shall demonstrate to
the county registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations
of citizenship under a constitutional form of government.") ; Ga. Const. art. 2
§ 1 para. 4 ("understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any para-
graph of the constitution of the United States or of this State that may be
read to them by any one of the registrars.").
61. Some recent findings of the Department of Justice, summarized in
a letter sent to the Senate by Warren Olney III, Assistant Attorney General
of the Criminal Division, were published in the New York Times, August 4,
1957: "The F.B.I. reports followed investigations into incidents in five south-
ern Louisiana parishes in 1956. The Justice Department presented cases
based on the reports to a Federal grand jury in Louisiana early this year, but
the all-white jury refused to return any indictments .. ,. many Negroes were
disqualified because they had written 'Negro' or 'colored' in a blank on the
registration form that said: 'My color is - .' The Federal agency said the
correct answer was supposed to be 'an actual color, such as brown, blue, red
or green.' Thus 'white' was a correct answer."
62. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101 (Sept. 9, 1957).
63. Id. at § 101.
64. Id. at § 111.
65. Id. at § 131. The language of the statute might be so construed as
actually applying to all elections for all types of officials. Senator Javits of
New York has taken the position that the act extends the Attorney General's
injunctive powers to local elections "as far down as those for dog-catcher."
See N.Y. Times, September 24, 1957, p. 6.
66. This was the most controversial section of the legislation. See § 151:
"In all cases of criminal contempt arising under the provisions of this act,
the accused, upon conviction, shall be punished by fine or imprisonment or
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States for preventive relief, including temporary and permanent
injunctions,6" and (3) strengthened juror competence rules aimed
at overriding state discrimination against Negroes. 8 While it is
impossible to assess the precise effect of this important new legisla-
tion at this time, there can be little doubt that it furnishes powerful
legal weapons in opening party organizations to all voters, regard-
less of race, if they were to be applied with determination and con-
sistency.
In addition to primary election pledges and legislation safe-
guarding party names,6 9 American political parties have sought or-
ganizational protection in special anti-raiding and anti-fusion stat-
utes. Such laws have been held not to be an arbitrary, discrimina-
tory restraint upon constitutionally safeguarded electoral rights.70
Splinter parties in New York, such as the American Labor Par-
ty and the American Liberal Party, with their heavy emphasis on
issues and ideology have caused the major parties, especially the
Democratic Party, considerable difficulties on substantive issues.
For example, the 1948 defection of the American Labor Party and
its refusal to support the Truman-Barkley ticket played a major
role in swinging New York's electoral vote to the G.O.P.71 The
politics of splinter parties in New York City created the somewhat
confusing picture of Mayor LaGuardia running under not less than
nine different party labels in the course of his career. In the mayor-
alty campaign of 1941 alone his name appeared on four different
tickets.72
New York's anti-raiding statute, the so-called Wilson-Pakula
law7 3 had as its avowed purpose that before a candidate could be-
both: Provided, however, that in case the accused is a natural person the fine to
be paid shall not exceed the sum of $1000, nor shall any imprisonment exceed
the term of six months; Provided further, however, that in the event such
proceeding for criminal contempt be tried before a judge without a jury and
the sentence of the court on conviction is a fine in excess of the sum of $300
or imprisonment in excess of forty-five days, the accused in said proceed-
ing, upon demand therefor, shall be entitled to a trial de novo before a jury
which shall conform as near as may be to the practice in other criminal cases."
67. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 85 Cong., 1st Sess. § 151.
68. Ibid.
69. Minnesota courts, for example, have likened these safeguarding laws
to protection offered owners of trade marks. See Holmes v. Holm, 217 Minn.
264, 14 N.W.2d 312 (1944) ; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 213 Minn. 140, 6 N.W.2d
47 (1942).
70. See Note, The Constitutionality of Anti-Fusion and Party-Raiding
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1207, 1213 (1947).
71. See Caldwell, The Government and Administration of New York
42 (1954).
72. See Bone, Political Parties in New York City, 40 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
272 (1946).
73. N.Y. Election Law § 137 (Supp. 1956).
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come the nominee of a political party he had to be either an enrollee
of that party at the time of his nomination or at least secure approval
of his candidacy by a duly constituted party committee for the po-
litical subdivision of the "office for which the nomination is to be
made." 7' In Werbel v. Gernstein,75 it was shown that the nominat-
ing petitions, allegedly on behalf of a Democratic party organiza-
tion, were actually ordered and largely signed by and on behalf of
members of the American Labor Party. The court concluded that
the proceedings by the Democratic party organization cancelling
the enrollments of the respondents had been in accordance with
law.76 With the political ideologies of the Democratic and American
Labor Party in Kings County "so different as to be irreconcilable,"
the court found the actions of the respondents as leading " to the
inevitable conclusion that there existed a common plan and scheme
by the members of the A.L.P. to capture and control the ... Demo-
cratic Party organization.1 77
An alleged invasion into the American Labor Party involving
former members of the Democratic Party was involved in Zuckman
v. Donahue.78 Here the court rejected any wholesale purge of
"paper" members deemed to be out of sympathy with the principles
of the party, but upheld the right of a party organization to cancel
registration of enrollees where it was "shown to be ... part of a
pre-arranged plan to seize control.1 79 The hearings before the Coun-
ty Chairman had based the determination of an enrollee's "sympa-
thy" upon such factors as their replies to a questionnaire, public
record indicating their previous party affiliations, the enrollment
dates, and subsequent political activities. "No single one of these
factors is controlling," the court insisted, "but the combination of
all [these] is unmistakably indicative of a lack of sympathy with
the purposes of the party, and clearly demonstrates that their enroll-
ments were prompted by ulterior motives."8 0 In another case, a
74. Id. at § 137(4). On the constitutionality of this statute see Ingersoll
v. Heffernan, 188 Misc. 1047, 71 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Ingersoll v.
Curran, 188 Misc. 1003, 70 N.Y.S2d 435 (Sup. Ct 1947).
75. 191 Misc. 275, 78 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 278, 78 N.Y.S2d at 442-43. But see I) re Gilhuly, 124 Conn.
271, 199 Atl. 436 (1938), where the court held that similar statutory language
does not give such official anything but mere ministerial duties and nothing
by way of judgment or discretion; and Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28
S.W.2d 515 (1930), where the court held that the power to pass on the
sincerity of the candidate's pledge, and to indorse or condemn his past party
record is to be exercised solely by the party voters.
78. 274 App. Div. 216, 80 N.Y.S2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
79. Id. at 217, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
80. Id. at 218, 80 N.Y.S2d at 701.
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mere verbal agreement with the principles of the Democratic Party
by a former American Liberal Party member was found to be en-
tirely insufficient when hearings before the Democratic county
committee established the fact that the respondents' acts belied his
words.8'
On the other hand, while the New York courts have upheld
these enrollment cancellations, they have also insisted that the
power of expulsion conferred upon such parties or incorporated
political associations must not exceed the party constitution or by-
laws in their terms, either express or implied. In Yockel v. German
American Bund, Inc.,6 2 the national leadership rested its case for
summary expulsion of certain officers of the Bronx unit largely up-
on their "despicable conduct" in discussing most critically and in
complete disregard of the "leadership principle", the activities of
the national officials.s 3 This type of authoritarian principle was held
by the court to be "contrary to the law of the land and the safe-
guards guaranteed every member by the United States Constitu-
tion."84
The courts of Arkansas 5 and Louisiana 6 have held that a po-
litical party organization may not refuse to certify another qualified
candidate or the nominee after the primary election results have
been officially determined. On the theory that these party commit-
tees have at that point ministerial duties only and no judicial pow-
ers whatever, these cases hold that if the nominees are otherwise
legally qualified, nothing remains for the political parties to do but
to certify their names to the proper state authorities for a place
on the general election ballot.
8 7
The results of judicial determination of the "White Primary",
anti-raiding statutes, and party laws in general seem to demonstrate
that the more political party organizations are drawn into the judi-
cial or legislative arena, even in the name of strengthened party
discipline, the less they can avoid further deterioration of their pre-
vious nearly autonomous common law status.
III. Presidential Electors and Party Organization
If a duly authorized state party convention once submits a ticket
of presidential electors in the spring of a presidential year, and
81. In re Mendelsohn, 197 Misc. 993, 99 N.Y.S2d 438 (1950). See Note,
34 Cornell L. Q. 430 (1949).
82. 20 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
83. Id. at 776-77.
84. Id. at 777.
85. Irby v. Barrett, 204 Ark. 682, 163 S.W.2d 512 (1942).
86. Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So.2d 507 (La. App. 1942) ; Allen v. Repub-
lican State Central Comm., 57 So.2d 248 (La. App. 1952).
87. See Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So.2d 507, 509 (La. App. 1942).
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political events cause a number of those already certified to declare
themselves unable or unwilling, if elected, to cast their vote for the
national nominees, may a subsequently called state convention ask
the Secretary of State to substitute a slate of "loyalist" electors in
place of the dissenters? This issue was raised in Seay v. Latham,"'
where a group of fifteen nominees-electors of the Texas Demo-
cratic Party selected at that party's May convention-indicated their
unwillingness to support the Democratic national ticket of Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. In effect, the court held that
in the absence of statute the state party convention could follow
any method of nominating its presidential electors, even if it were
to violate its owns customs. The court maintained that after taking
cognizance of the course of certain political events, including the
proceedings and debates in precinct and district conventions lead-
ing up to the September convention at which the majority called for
a ticket of "loyalist" electors, the Secretary of State had no alterna-
tive but to make the requested substitutions.8 9
Utmost legal "flexibility" to respond promptly to possible de-
mands by States' Rights adherents for separatism is well illustrated
by a 1948 Virginia statute.9 0 Under its provisions, presidential elec-
tors selected by the state conventions of their respective parties are
expected to vote for the national presidential ticket unless spe-
cifically instructed by a second convention, at least sixty days before
the November general election, to vote for different persons.91 If
this should develop, then the national party may still have electors
pledged to its nominees shown on the ballot also. Beyond this,
other groups, not able to qualify as parties under the code, may also
under separate name be given a place on the general election ballot
for their respective presidential and vice presidential nominees.9
2
88. 143 Tex. 1, 182 S.W2d 251 (1944).
89. Id. at 9, 182 S.W.2d at 255. Texas courts have so interpreted their
election law that presidential electors are not "state officials" in the sense
that a governor is a state officer. Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 181 S.W.2d
269 (1944). There are also cases to the effect that presidential electors are
"state officers." See Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937).
Statutory language "state-wide officers" includes presidential electors:
Vaughan v. Boone, 191 Md. 515, 62 A.2d 351 (1948). That presidential electors
are "state officers" and thus subject to the provisions of the primary law was an
important consideration in the judicial barring of the States' Rights party
from Oklahoma ballot in 1948: Lillard v. Cordell, 200 Okla. 577, 198 P.2d
417 (1948). Another approach to the status of presidential electors was noted
in a Utah case where the supreme court considered them to be not "public"
officers but "party" officers and at that, rather unimportant officials. Markham
v. Bennion, 122 Utah 562, 252 P.2d 539 (1953).
90. Va. Code Ann. § 24-290.6 (1950). See Note, 34 Va. L. Rev. 619(1948).
91. Va. Code Ann. § 24-290.6 (1950).
92. Id. at § 24-290.3.
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Presidential electors may be nominated by primaries, party com-
mittees, or conventions. In nearly half of the states where the so-
called "presidential short ballot" is used, their names are not
entered on the general election ballot at all.93 In 1952, the "regular"
Democrats in Alabama wished to protect themselves against strong
states' rights forces. The State Executive Committee required that
those seeking the nomination for the office of presidential elector on
the Democratic Party's ticket would have to take an oath of loyalty
to support the candidates for president and vice president as nomi-
nated by the national convention.' Edmund Blair, a candidate for
the office of presidential elector, not only struck out the sentence
which would so pledge him but also added the following:
"I will not cast an electoral vote for Harry S. Truman or for
any one who advocates the Truman-Humphrey Civil Rights
Program." 94
In a dispute over the validity of the required oath, the Alabama
Supreme Court held that while the State Democratic Executive
Committee may prescribe the political qualifications of candidates
in the Democratic primaries, the office of presidential elector is a
federal one and thus governed by the twelfth amendment of the
federal Constitution. The presidential electors cannot be so limited
by the wording of that amendment in their freedom of choice, de-
spite the prevailing and traditional view that they are to cast their
vote in accordance with the wishes of their party.95
In Ray v. Blair,9 a divided United States Supreme Court re-
versed this decision, on the ground that there is nothing constitu-
tionally incompatible between the requirements of the twelfth
amendment and a state-authorized party demand that those wishing
to seek the nomination for the office of presidential elector should
pledge themselves beforehand to support their party's national nomi-
nees.9 7 The Court stated: "This long continued practical interpre-
tation of the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge
[of such a candidate] ... weighs heavily in considering the consti-
tutionality of such a pledge." 98s
93. Silva, State Law on the Nomination, Election, and Instruction of
Presidential Electors, 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 523 (1948). Other such laws
enacted since 1948 include: Ark. Acts Art. 67 (1953) ; Fla. Laws c. 29934(1955) ; Me. Rev. Stat. § 4:2 (1949) ; Nev. Laws § 4767.02 (Supp. 1943-49) ;
N.Y. Laws c. 6 (1956) (for military absentee ballots); Ohio Laws § 3505.10
(1955) ; Utah Laws c. 37:1 (1947) ; W.Va. Acts c. 63 § 4 (1955-56).
94. Ray v. Blair, 257 Ala. 151, 153, 57 So.2d 395, 396 (1952).
95. Ibid. See also Fisher v. Taylor, 210 Ark 380, 196 S.W.2d 217 (1946).
96. 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
97. Id. at 231.
98. Id. at 229-30.
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In his dissent to Ray v. Blair,99 Justice Jackson expressed a con-
cern that the forcing of presidential electors to pledge support for
the national nominees would lead to a "complete suppression of com-
petition between different views within the party"'00 and to the
effective exclusion from the primary of all those unwilling to
"follow blindly anyone chosen by the national convention."'' 1 This
position seems to underrate the already powerful centrifugal socio-
economic forces operative in American politics. Nor does this posi-
tion seem to acknowledge adequately the mobility of the American
electorate-even a Southern electorate-as so dramatically illus-
trated in the defections from the Democrats to the Republicans in
the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections.
In another Alabama case, decided earlier in 1952,' 02that state's
highest court had already acknowledged in explicit language that the
State Executive Committee of the Democratic party could legally
State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party could legally
require of all voters the following pledge as a condition precedent to
their participation in the primaries:
"By casting this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the
result of this Primary Election and to aid and support all the
nominees thereof in the ensuing General Elections. I do further
pledge myself to aid and support the nominees of the national
convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice
President of the United States.'10 3
The importance of these two cases is not inconsiderable, in that
they clearly furnish the legal underpinnings for the efforts of
"loyalist" Southern Democrats to combat States' Rights "devia-
tion" and maintain their association with the national party. On
the other hand, perhaps equally significant, the Seay case'0 ' well
99. 343 U.S. at 231.
100. Id. at 235.
101. Ibid.
102. Ray v. Gardner, 257 Ala. 168, 170, 57 So.2d 824, 825 (1952).
103. Id. at 170, 57 So.2d at 825. The Alabama Code actually provided "at
the bottom of the ballot... shall be printed the following, viz.: 'By casting
this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this primary election
and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing general elec-
tion."' Ala. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 350 (1940). The State Executive Committee
added the following words by resolution adopted January 26, 1952: "I do
further pledge myself to aid and support the nominees of the National Con-
vention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice President of the
United States." While the instant case dealt with the specific issue whether
mandamus would lie to require the probate judge to have this amended
pledge printed on the ballot (which the court did not sustain on the basis that
"he cannot be required to do anything but that which the law requires him
to do") the court stressed the "full right, power and authority" possessed by
such committee to require this pledge as a condition precedent to participa-
tion in the party primary.
104. Seay v. Lathamn, 143 Tex. 1, 182 S.W.2d 251 (1944).
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demonstrated that there is nothing to prevent a severing of such
national party links if and when a state convention, called or re-
called subsequent to the National Convention, should so decide.
IV. New Parties and Recognition Proceedings
The difficulties for third or minor parties to obtain legal recog-
nition are very real and have long been so recognized. That these
difficulties can also be overrated may be seen from the fact that in
the four presidential elections of 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948 alone,
thirty-three states had places on the general election ballot for one
or more minority party. Even in states where the legal barriers
stipulated proved procedurally complex, more than fifty per cent
made it possible for one or more such parties to obtain a place
on the ballot.1 05 Where the status of new parties, by legislative
design, were made dependent on administrative recognition, judicial
determinations of such actions revealed some rather diverse ap-
proaches by the courts.
A California statute stipulated, among other things, (1) the
exclusion of any political party "which uses or adopts as any part
of its party designation the word 'Communist' or any derivative of
the word 'Communist' "1081 and (2) the grant to the Secretary of
State, with the advice and consent of the Attorney General, the
power to determine administratively which political party came
within the prohibitions against organizations advocating the forceful
overthrow of government. 10 7 On the theory that the legislature has
the power to determine the conditions upon which a political party
may participate in the primaries, the California Supreme Court
accepted the contention that the public interest requires the exclu-
sion from the ballot of political parties advocating the violent over-
throw of government. 08 It rejected, however, as constitutionally in-
valid, the denial of the primary election machinery to "particularly
dangerous citizens" by the device of outlawing a name. 0 9 This, the
court maintained, was special legislation which "has no reasonable
relation to the purposes which the legislature had in mind . . .
[since] the change of a party name would satisfy the statute without
altering the political doctrines at which the legislature has aimed its
restrictions."'' 10 The court added that the administrative discretion
105. See Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 Yale
L. J. 1276 (1948).
106. Cal. Stat. c. 6, § 1 (1940), repealed, Cal. Stat. c. 1217, § 3 (1953).
107. Cal. Elections Code § 2540.9 (1953).
108. Connunist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942).
109. Id. at 546, 127 P.2d at 893-94.
110. Id. at 550, 127 P2d at 897-98.
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given to the Secretary of State violated notice and hearing require-
ments and that the judicial review provision was an insufficient safe-
guard since "the court's action could not possibly come in time to
repair the damage which would result from the temporary suspen-
sion of the party's right to participate in the election."'"
A rather different interpretation of a Secretary of State's min-
isterial powers was noted in connection with a petition by the
Progressive Party of 1948 for a place on the ballot under the laws
of Oklahoma. The applicable statute required a newly organized
political party wishing to have its candidates on the ballot to file
petitions including five thousand signatures with the Secretary of
State, who in turn would certify such party to the State Election
Board."x2 In Cooper v. Cartwright,1" 3 the Secretary of State was
shown to have so certified the Progressive Party on the assumption
that it was a party in the sense of the statute. A divided court held
that "filing of a petition does not create the party, 1" 4 and that the
party "must be in existence when it files the petition."" 5 Before any
political party can be considered as such, added the court, certain
requirements must be met. Without reference to any statutory basis,
the court insisted upon such criteria as "effort to organize," "formu-
lation of principles for which that party stands," general party
meetings, and delegate conventions adopting party principles upon
which the nominees would stand.
1 16
The law of Ohio stipulates that before a new political party
could be legally recognized and offered a place on the ballot, the
111. Id. at 555, 127 P.2d at 900. While upholding as "severable" those
provisions of the statute which barred from participation in the primary politi-
cal parties advocating the violent overthrow of the government, the court con-
sidered the following statutory language "which is directly or indirectly
affiliated, by any means whatsoever, with . . . any other foreign agency,
political party, organization or government.. ." as much too vague, too broad
and too far removed from the power of the legislature to limit the constitu-
tional rights of suffrage. The statute in question was subsequently modified
in line with this decision and reenacted. See Cal. Stat. c. 1217 § 1.5. See also
Independent Progressive Party v. County Clerk, 31 Cal.2d 549, 191 P.2d 6(1948). The portion of the Peek case upholding the power of the legislature
to bar certain parties from the polls was prominently cited and relied on in
supporting the right of county supervisors to keep civil servants from public
employment who were unwilling to sign a loyalty oath or affidavit. Hirschman
v. Los Angeles County, 231 P.2d 140 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951), aff'd, 39 Cal.
2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952).
112. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 229 (1941).
113. 200 Okla. 456, 195 P.2d 290 (1948).
114. Id. at 460, 195 P.2d at 294.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid. In a strongly worded dissent, the absence of any statutory
basis for such "tests" was pointed out. Maintaining that the two major politi-
cal parties do not live up to these required criteria either, the dissent argued
that the law should apply indiscriminately to old and new parties. 200 Okla.
at 462, 195 P.2d at 298 (dissenting opinion).
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group must file with the Secretary of State an affidavit to the effect
"that it does not advocate, either directly or indirectly, the over-
throw of our government." 117 The Wallace Committee was refused
such certification by the Secretary of State in 1948, on the grounds
that his investigations revealed at least three of the group and some
signers of a petition containing forty-five thousand names, to be
Communists. His findings were reversed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in Beck v. Hummel,118 where it was acknowledged that
while there was no requirement for formal hearing and cross-
examination, "there must be in the record of the investigation by
the Secretary substantial facts or evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of the good faith or honesty of an affiant whose affidavit
fully complies upon its face with the provisions of [law].""x
The Progressive Party in Cook County, Illinois, was given legal
recognition in the state primary by a rather liberal statutory con-
struction using the device of a declaratory judgment. The Illinois
Supreme Court termed such proceedings to have been neither
equitable nor one at law, but a proceeding sui generis; that is, "some-
what similar to an election contest.' 2 0 In an attempt to seek state-
wide recognition, the leaders of the Progressive Party were then
faced with the statutory requirement that of twenty-five thousand
petitioners, two hundred had to come "from at least each of the 50
counties.' 2' They alleged that in as much as fifty-two per cent of
the State's registered voters were residents of one county and only
thirteen per cent resided in the fifty-three least populated counties,
this statute in effect constituted a denial of due process under the
fourteenth amendment, violated Articles I, II, and IV, and the
seventeenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 22
Relying strongly on a previous refusal to use the Federal Con-
stitution as a device of forcing Illinois to redistrict more propor-
tionally,22 a divided United States Supreme Court considered this
signature distribution requirement to be "allowable state policy."',
It would be an unwarrantedly detrimental position, the Court main-
117. Ohio Gen. Code Ann., §§ 4785-100a (1941).
118. 150 Ohio 127,80 N.E.2d 899 (1948).
119. Id. at 139,80 N.E2d at 905.
120. Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 106, 79 N.E.2d 516, 518(1948). See Faherty v. Board of Election Conm'rs, 5 IUl2d 519, 126 N.E.2d
235 (1955); People ex rel. Schlaman v. Electoral Board, 4 Ill.2d 504, 122 N.E.
2d 532 (1955); Progressive Party v. Flynn, 401 Ill. 573, 82 N.E.2d 476(1948) ; Recall Bennett Comm. v. Bennett, 196 Ore. 299, 249 P.2d 479 (1952).
121. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 46 § 10-2 (1947).
122. McDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 283 (1948).
123. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). See also South v. Peters,
339 U.S. 276 (1950).
124. McDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
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tained, "applying such broad constitutional concepts.., to deny a
state the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as
between its thinly populated counties and those having concen-
trated masses.' 25
This judicial unwillingness to intervene on behalf of more
equitable legislative representation and force reapportionment has
come under severe and significant attack in a recent case from the
district court of Hawaii.' The court there denied a motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction, and sustained a voter's suit seeking
relief from the failure of the legislature to reapportion for fifty-five
years. Under the provisions of the Organic Act of Hawaii,127 the
territorial legislature has the explicit duty to reapportion "from time
to time."'1 28 "Biased inaction," the Chief Judge wrote, "has had the
same result as biased'action. It is a denial of the equal protection of
the laws."' 29 Although the court acknowledged the peculiar terri-
torial status of Hawaii as an element distinguishing it from the
Colegrove case"3 0 in which a state of the Union was involved, it
based its central argument squarely on the denial of geographic
equality. The court reasoned that if the federal government has
the power to assure Negroes the right to participate in political
party primaries'2 ' and if it can force state educational systems to
desegregate, 32 then the federal government cannot remain silent
when geographic discriminations deprive citizens of their con-
stitutional rights.3
3
The reasoning of the Hawaiian court was rejected by a majority
of a federal district court of Oklahoma late in 1956, in an actibn
by voters against the Governor, state legislature, members of the
state supreme court, and others, for a mandatory injunction to force
reaportionment as required by the state constitution.134 The court
reaffirmed the view that Colegrove was preferable and binding law
for the facts involved in the action. The Dyer case, upon which the
plaintiff relied, was distinguished on the grounds that while the
relationship of the territory of Hawaii to the federal government
125. Id. at 284. For similar statutes see, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws c. 53§ 6 (Supp. 1953) ; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 4785 (Supp. 1945).
126. Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D.Hawaii 1956).
127. 31 Stat. 150 (1900), 48 U.S.C.A. § 562 (1952).
128. Ibid.
129. 138 F. Supp. at 226.
130. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
131. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
132. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. 138 F. Supp. at 225-26.
134. Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aff'd per




distinguished that case from the facts presented in Colegrove, no
such distinction could be drawn in the instant case. The dissenting
opinion argued that although this court could not grant mandamus
to "affirmatively remap" the political districts of a state, it could
and should declare the existing electoral system invalid as a violation
of equal protection of the laws.'3 5
Political scientists who have studied and experienced the prac-
tical political problems of state reapportionment will find much to
applaud in the decision and reasoning of the Dyer case. As such,
this case cannot easily be charged to represent judicial intervention
based either on an unwarranted and exaggerated view of judicial
omnipotence, or on a type of judicial lawmaking historically asso-
ciated with an undesirably subjective application of substantive due
process of law. When the court, referring to the constitutional
language calling for periodic reapportionment, insisted that the
legislators obey the same law that those who vote for them must
obey,1386 it cannot easily be charged with having read into the law
something that was not there to be read. There are, however, at
least three caveats that need to be stressed: (1) this reasoning has
direct relevance to those states only which have constitutional pro-
visions explicitly demanding that the legislature is to apportion
itself from time to time; (2) forces now opposing the calling and
convening of a state constitutional convention in a state urgently
in need of reapportionment may be reinforced in their hostility by
the fear that such a convention once in session may well wish to
incorporate such explicit language for periodic reapportioning, and
stipulate appropriate judicial or other sanctions for enforcement; and
(3) if the Supreme Court were to uphold the Hawaiian case, by re-
versing its previous position toward what it terms "political ques-
tions," this would then constitute another significant growth in
federal power over the already greatly weakened states' rights posi-
tion at a time when the political climate is most inappropriate and
dangerously tense.
An illustration of how the 1948 States' Rights Democrats bene-
fited from a rather narrow interpretation of administrative discre-
tion was noted in a North Carolina case. There the State Board of
Elections had adopted certain rules demanding that voters wishing
to create a new party must attach to their required petition certifi-
cates from county boards of elections, attesting that they are
properly registered, and that they had not voted in another exist-
135. 145 F. Supp. at 547.
136. Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 22 (D. Hawaii 1956).
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ing party's primary.'37 The States' Rights Party contended tha
the petitions were sufficient without complying with the Board'
rules for certification of non-participation and sought throug
mandamus to have the names of their presidential candidates printe(
on the official general election ballot. A divided court held that thi
primary law provisions were inapplicable to "new parties" create(
by petition, and that the law gave the voter the right to sign sucl
petitions irrespective of the election board's requirements of non
participation in another party's primary. "We are not concernec
here," the court reasoned, "with any moral obligations which par.
ticipatign in the primary election ... may put upon voters.... ,1&
The court held the rules of the Board of Elections to be "legislatin
rather than regulating" and therefore in excess of its statutor
authority.'89
VI. Summary and Concluding Observations
However lofty the motivating objectives behind the statutes thai
sought to modify and reform political party organizational autono-
my, there can now be little doubt about the impressive distance
between their present greatly weakened legal status and the immense
powers they once possessed as voluntary unincorporated associa-
tions under the common law. 40 This trend was shown to have been
further accentuated by judicial determinations that (1) affected the
powers of party organizations to exclude otherwise qualified voters
from participating in the party's primaries merely because of race;
(2) permitted considerable variation in state administrative scrutiny
of party ideology, principles, and motives, particularly in recogni-
tion proceedings involving new parties; (3) called for fairly elabo-
rate procedural safeguards before upholding the decisions rendered
by party tribunals on behalf of organizational integrity when it
involved cancelation proceedings of party "invaders" and "subver-
sives"; and (4) construed most narrowly the powers of party com-
mittees to administer funds and property where authorized by
statutes in defraying expenditures related to party primaries.
On the other hand, cases were also noted that pointed rather
clearly to a continued judicial emphasis and inclination to rely on
the doctrine of "non-intervention" with respect to factional and
137. States' Rights Democratic Party v. State Board of Elections, 229
N.C. 179, 49 S.E.2d 379 (1948).
138. Id. at 189, 49 S.E.2d at 386.
139. Id. at 187, 49 S.E.2d at 385.
140. On the evolution of the legal status of political party organizations
prior to 1938, see Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, 34
Am. Pol. Sdi. Rev. 439 (1940).
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organizational struggles in party conventions and committees. The
more remote the locus of party organizational dispute was from the
actual nominating process, the less acute seemed to be the likelihood
of judicial intervention.
Next to the legal opening of Southern party primaries to
Negroes, there was perhaps no more significant judicial determina-
tion in the twenty year period here reviewed than that of the
Blair 41 case, in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the
right of a state party organization to pledge candidates for the office
of presidential elector to the support of the party's national nomi-
nees. The rationale of the Dyer case, 142 if adopted by the Supreme
Court, could likewise have striking effect on political organization.
The import of these developments upon a possibly heightened sense
of national party discipline is, however, most difficult to assess.
This is due to parallel legislative measures and party rules recently
provided in a number of the Southern states which allow the leader-
ship to re-convene state conventions if this be deemed necessary in
view of national developments, and which eased also certain statu-
tory requirements facilitating the creation of new, ad hoc, political
parties and organizations. The present legal status of presidential
electors underscores again most clearly the peculiar characteristic
of the American party system as a coalition not only of interest
groups but essentially of state based parties as well. On balance,
aside from the basic and long range consequences arising out of the
direct and preferential primaries, and as a result of the newly en-
acted Civil Rights Act, judicial determinations of party statutes and
disputes have resulted in no new or fundamental legal obstacles
to the revitalization and growth of intra-party democracy.
141. See note 96, upra.
142. See discussion at note 126 supra.
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